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Drugs offer a complementary approach to vaccines for preventing the progression of symptoms and onset
of the severe manifestations of dengue. Despite the rapid maturation of the research and development
infrastructure for dengue drugs and the increasing frequency of dengue inhibitors reported in the scien-
tiﬁc literature, the potential size of the market for dengue drugs has not been articulated. In the present
work, extrapolating from publicly available information, we explored the economic burden attributable
to dengue, the impact of dengue vaccines on clinical case loads, a possible alternative to tiered pricing for
products for neglected diseases, and deﬁned the maximum potential market for a dengue drug. Our pro-
jections suggest that in 2006, the annual global burden of dengue was US $1.7 billion. Our proposed alter-
native to existing tiered pricing structures is that during a temporary period of market exclusivity,
individual countries would pay 50% of the per-case equivalent of economic costs saved through the
use of a dengue drug. This would yield prices per case of US $13–$239 depending on drug effectiveness
and cost of medical and indirect costs and lost productivity in different countries. Assuming that such a
pricing scheme was embraced, the maximum potential market for a dengue drug or drugs that on average
reduced 40% of economic costs might be as high as US $338 million annually. Our simulations suggest
that dengue vaccines will begin to reduce the clinical case load of dengue in 2022, but that the number
of cases will not decrease below 2006 levels and the proportion vaccinated will remain well below that
required for the onset of herd immunity during the period of market exclusivity after the licensure of the
ﬁrst wave of dengue drugs.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Approximately 2.5–3.5 billion of the world’s population is at
risk of contracting dengue (TDR, 2009; WHO, 2012a). Estimates
of the number of new infections range from 50 to 230 million
annually (Sanoﬁ, 2009; WHO, 2012a) of which approximately a
quarter are sufﬁciently debilitating to require medical attention
(reviewed by Shepard et al., 2004). Approximately 3–6% of clinical
cases progress from an acute but uncomplicated febrile form of the
disease to dengue hemorrhagic fever or dengue shock syndrome
(Shepard et al., 2004; WHO, 2012a). This manifestation of the dis-
ease may be fatal. The death toll based on ofﬁcial estimates is
approximately 12,500 (WHO, 2012a), but is likely substantially
higher as the majority of cases are not ofﬁcially reported (see
summary in Suaya et al., 2009).
A number of dengue vaccines are in development (Coller et al.,
2011; Danko et al., 2011; Durbin et al., 2011; Guy et al., 2011;
Osorio et al., 2011). This has inspired a body of work related to
the economic costs of the disease (see review by Beatty et al.,: +1 202 688 2832.
(G. Dow).
-NC-ND license. 2011). Suaya et al. (2009) described the medical and non-medical
costs of severe and uncomplicated dengue in ambulatory and hos-
pital settings in eight countries in South America and South East
Asia, and estimated the burden of dengue in these countries to
be $238 million annually based on ofﬁcial case reports. This study
also projected the potential economic burden within a limited geo-
graphic range using various multipliers for unreported cases. This
study did not attempt to describe the global burden of dengue,
or the economic beneﬁt that might be created by a dengue drug
or vaccine. This was one of the objectives of the present study.
It is more likely than not that a dengue vaccine (Guy et al.,
2011) will be approved and available for distribution by 2015. Four
other vaccines, which are licensed to a total of seven companies or
institutions, are in early clinical development. These other vaccines
may come into production between 2017 and 2021 if successfully
developed and approved by regulators. Based on results from
Phase IIB studies, dengue vaccines are expected to be effective
(Sanoﬁ, 2012). Annual plant capacity of the ﬁrst vaccine will be
limited to 100 million doses (Sanoﬁ, 2009) which is sufﬁcient to
vaccinate 33 million assuming a three dose regimen and no wast-
age. Given that the at-risk population is 2.5–3.5 billion one would
suspect that this level of vaccination may be unlikely to result in a
substantial reduction in dengue cases in the short term. Access
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vaccine too high in endemic countries or market the vaccine to
developed country travelers in order to recover research and devel-
opment costs. The prospect of antibody-dependent enhancement,
if it eventuated, would further limit the impact of vaccines.
Drugs are a complementary intervention that may be useful for
patients who contract dengue because they did not receive an
approved dengue vaccine or for whom prior vaccination was inef-
fective. A dengue drug would be useful to a patient if, when admin-
istered after a clinical diagnosis of dengue, it resolved symptoms
and/or prevented progression to dengue hemorrhagic fever or den-
gue shock syndrome. Such a drug would also reduce or eliminate
the associated medical and indirect economic costs for individual
patients and government health systems. However, the unmet
medical need for a dengue drug might be limited if sufﬁcient den-
gue vaccines are available at reasonable cost and the annual case
rate is reduced nearly to zero. Therefore another objective of this
study was to simulate the effect of vaccine introduction on annual
case loads during the time frame of the potential introduction of a
dengue drug.
One of the most vexing issues in the marketing of drugs in
emerging markets is the issue of pricing. Tiered pricing, where a
drug is priced in two or three different bands for countries based
on GDP, has evolved as the global standard in response to sustained
community pressure for greater patient access to drugs (Moon
et al., 2011). However, this convention has recently been critiqued
as arbitrary and fails to account for income inequality within coun-
tries that are nominally middle income (discussed by Moon et al.,
2011). The alternative is to segment the market into public and pri-
vate sectors, but this approach may be inefﬁcient and difﬁcult to
implement (Moon et al., 2011). A third approach is for a company
to maintain the price in emerging markets at prices approaching
the variable costs of manufacturing. This maintains prices at lower
levels, but has been criticized as being anti-competitive (Moon
et al., 2011). Therefore, the ﬁnal objective of this study was to ex-
plore an alternative pricing scheme based on an objective, equitable
distribution of the economic savings of drug intervention with the
intent of deﬁning the maximum potential market for dengue drugs.2. Methods
2.1. Global economic burden of dengue
Diseases impose an economic burden on society that includes
direct medical costs to the health system or individuals, non-med-
ical costs related to the treatment of the disease, and lost produc-
tivity (work or school days lost by the patient or family members
as a consequence of the disease). The per-case economic burden
of dengue, using these cost inputs, has been reported by Suaya
et al. (2009) and others for eight countries in Asia and the Ameri-
cas, representing 64% of the global burden of this disease. We used
these input data to determine the economic burden of dengue in
these countries based on the number of reported cases (Table 1).
We estimated the total and by segment cost per case and eco-
nomic burden in the rest of the world (ROW, Table 1, right column)
by adjusting for ofﬁcial caseload and on average threefold lower
GDP per capita in other denguemarkets (economic burden in coun-
tries studied by Suaya et al..36/.64.33). For each of the four mar-
ket segments (ambulatory versus hospitalization and public versus
private) we then calculated an average cost per case (total burden/
total number of cases, see Table 2). This was further adjusted to take
into account the threefold lower GDP in countries not covered by
Suaya et al. (2009), see Table 2. We also calculated a weighted aver-
age of the proportion of cases in each market segment based on
caseloads reported by Suaya et al. (2009), see Table 2.However, ofﬁcial reported cases of dengue under-estimate the
number of clinical cases of the disease (discussed by Suaya et al.,
2009), so the global economic burden of dengue reported based
on reported cases is conservative. Therefore, we adjusted the global
caseload and economic burden upwards by a factor of 6, to account
for unreported cases (Armien et al., 2008). The same assumptions
regarding dengue case loads and adjustments for unreported cases
were also made for the vaccine impact model (next Section). Our
estimates for global clinical case load, economic burden, and
weighted average cost per case are presented in Table 3 (top three
rows).
2.2. Vaccination rates and clinical case load following the introduction
of dengue vaccines
A dengue drug will have clinical utility if the availability and
market penetration of dengue vaccines is insufﬁcient to eliminate
transmission of dengue. We constructed a Monte Carlo Simulation
model (10,000 simulations) using Oracle Crystal Ball to project fu-
ture dengue case loads based on current trends and publicly avail-
able information about dengue vaccines. The key assumptions of
the model including distributions, most likely, minimum and max-
imum values are summarized in Table 4. Generally we have as-
sumed a normal distribution, with a standard deviation of 10%
around the most likely value, except where there was speciﬁc
information from the literature that suggested an alternative dis-
tribution might be appropriate. More details regarding some of
the assumptions are outlined below.
Sanoﬁ’s tetravalent dengue vaccine is in Phase III trials. We se-
lected a probability of successful completion of the Phase III pro-
gram and licensure at 75% based on our perception of industry
norms for a typical biotech product. A launch of date of 2015 is fea-
sible if there are no delays in Sanoﬁ’s development program. Invir-
agen, GSK, and Merck all have dengue vaccines in development,
and NIH, has licensed its technology to four institutions or compa-
nies regionally. These other efforts appear to be in late Phase I or
early Phase II, and so could in theory be licensed in a 2017–2021
time window if development plans remain on track. Therefore,
we selected the most likely licensure date as 2019, with minimum
andmaximum ranges of 2017 and 2021. We have assumed that the
probability of achieving licensure for each of these vaccines is
approximately 21% (35% probability of success in Phase II  60%
probability of success in Phase III) based on industry norms for a
typical biotech product in early clinical development (Zemmel
and Shiekh, 2010). The probability of discrete numbers (0–7) of
additional vaccines being approved was then calculated.
We have assumed that the volume of dengue vaccine doses sold
will be limited by capacity, and that the price of dengue vaccines
that is negotiated will be set in a manner that will allow the avail-
able capacity to be sold. Sanoﬁ has publicly stated that their plant
capacity will be 100 million doses annually, which is vastly less
than the number of doses that would be required to vaccinate
the entire population given that a three dose regimen will be re-
quired. Given the scale of the investment involved, 350 million
euros for the plant alone (Sanoﬁ, 2009), Sanoﬁ as a publicly traded
company would be legally required to disclose a decision to sub-
stantially increase capacity. Unlike small molecules, for which
capacity given sufﬁcient resources is in theory limitless, the pro-
duction and regulation of a biologic is inherently connected to a
speciﬁc physical plant. A decision to increase capacity beyond
incremental increases would require at least four years of lead time
and a similar level of investment as existing capacity. Therefore,
we have assumed that any decision to increase capacity by Sanoﬁ
or other potential manufacturers will only occur after the success-
ful licensure of at least one vaccine and when vaccine pricing strat-
egies become clearer.
Table 1
Country level break-down of per-case dengue costs, case disposition and medical setting. All costs are in 2006 $US. Source data are from Suaya et al. (2009).
Parameter Market Average ROW
estimate
Americas Asia
Brazil El
Salvador
Guatemala Panama Venezuela Cambodia Malaysia Thailand
Total average cost of an ambulatory case ($) 291 88 88 332 168 - 317 - 199 66
Total average cost of a hospitalization case ($) 676 457 418 1065 627 115 947 573 600 198
Average direct medical costs of an ambulatory
case ($)
37 22 19 63 60 – 193 – 71 24
Average direct medical costs of a hospitalization
case ($)
290 323 327 559 438 28 752 468 414 136
Proportion of ambulatory cases in private sector
(%)
49 5 30 22 24 0 19 0 14 14
Proportion of hospitalization cases in private
sector (%)
47 0 0 19 0 0 1 0 3 3
Proportion of cases which are ambulatory (%) 75 53 75 96 65 0 45 0 48 48
Proportion of cases which are hospitalizations (%) 25 47 25 4 35 100 55 100 52 52
Reported # of dengue cases per country
(thousands)
387 11 8 2 44 11 31 81 27 323
Total annual number of ambulatory cases in
public sector (thousands)
148 5.5 4.2 1.5 22 0 11 0 24 132
Total economic burden of ambulatory cases in
public sector ($, millions)
43 0.49 0.37 0.5 3.7 0 3.6 0 6.5 12
Total annual number of ambulatory cases in
private sector (thousands)
142 0.29 1.8 0.42 6.9 0 2.7 0 1.7 22
Total economic burden of ambulatory cases in
private sector ($, millions)
41 0.03 0.16 0.14 1.2 0 0.84 0 0.33 1.4
Total annual number of hospitalization cases in
public sector (thousands)
51 5.2 2 0.07 15 11 17 81 23 164
Total economic burden of hospitalization cases in
public sector ($, millions)
34 2.3 0.83 0.07 9.7 1.3 16 46 14 22
Total annual number of hospitalization cases in
private sector (thousands)
45 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.2 0 0.03 4.8
Total economic burden of hospitalization cases in
private sector ($, millions)
31 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.2 0 0.02 1
Total combined economic burden for all cases ($,
millions)
150 2.9 1.4 0.7 14 1.3 20 46 21 36
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developed countries (which overlaps with the market for yellow
fever and Japanese encephalitis vaccines). We have assumed Sanoﬁ
will target this segment, but that the volume sold will constitute a
small proportion of production (10%). Sanoﬁ will be subject to sub-
stantial community pressure to sell most of its vaccine in lower
and middle income countries. Pricing of dengue vaccines is very
unlikely to be determined by the free market. Rather, it will be
determined through negotiation with key national governments,
and this will set a benchmark that other countries will follow (as
was the case with GSK’s pneumococcal vaccine, Moon et al.,
2011). National governments will demand a price that is afford-
able. We assume that Sanoﬁ will act in a rational manner and agree
to a price that allows all of its volume to be sold, since artiﬁcial
restriction of supply below 100 million doses will not increase
prices but will be associated with substantial negative community
pressure.
Production costing of the future Butanten-NIH-licensed vaccine
plant has been based on a 60 million dose capacity (Mahoney et al.,
2012). The planned capacity of other plants is not known. In the
absence of more speciﬁc information, the most reasonable assump-
tion is that capacity will be equivalent or below that of the Sanoﬁ
plant (100 million doses annually).
We assumed a vulnerable population at 3.0 billion (with a range
from 2.5–3.5 billion), in 2009, with an average population growth
rate of 1.02% and a mean lifespan of 71.9 years. These values rep-
resent a weighted average for the countries with the largest case
loads per country (Brazil, Venezuela and Thailand, see Table 1)
and the global average for the rest of the world (data for averagelifespan and annual population growth from theWorld Bank, avail-
able at www.google.com/publicdata). Sanoﬁ’s vaccination schedule
is known to be a three dose regimen (Sanoﬁ, 2012). We have as-
sumed, as have others (Amarasinghe and Mahoney, 2011) that
25% will be wasted. We assumed that some of the later vaccines
may offer improvement terms of shortening of the vaccination
schedule (to one or two doses). We predict that the efﬁcacy of a
dengue vaccine will be 81% (cumulative probability of an efﬁcacy
of 95% against all four serotypes). Finally, we predict, as others
have assumed (Amarasinghe and Mahoney, 2011), that the pediat-
ric market will be targeted ﬁrst in developing countries as this is
most cost effective from the customer (government) perspective,
and additional capacity if available will be used for ‘catch-up’ vac-
cination. We have not explicitly included the possibility that catch-
up vaccination might require fewer doses due to prior dengue
exposure, as there are currently no clinical efﬁcacy data for the
dengue vaccines in development.
With these input assumptions, we performed 10,000 simula-
tions to model the effect on the annual clinical case rate of dengue,
and the cumulative proportion of the population unvaccinated
from the year of introduction of the ﬁrst dengue vaccine (2015) un-
til eight years after the latest feasible introduction of a dengue drug
currently in the discovery phase of development (2033). Based on
precedent, eight years is the likely period during which premium
pricing could be negotiated with national governments. The year
by year projected clinical case load and cumulative proportion
unvaccinated are presented in Figs. 1 and 2. We have presented
the range of possible outcomes for these two variables in 2033 in
Figs. 3 and 5, and corresponding variance analyses in Figs. 4 and 6.
Table 2
Weighted average economic burden of dengue per case (2006 US $) and weighted proportion of total cases for each market segment.
Treatment Setting Average cost per case
in Suaya et al. countries ($)
Weighted average cost per
case including ROW ($)
Proportion of
total cases (%)
Ambulatory public 269 204 33
Ambulatory private 283 215 27
Hospital public 609 462 32
Hospital private 677 514 8
Table 3
Global aggregate economic burden, pricing and spending on a dengue drug with various capacities to relieve the economic
burden of dengue (all economic values in 2006 US $).
Economic burden relieved and associated pricing – Global Aggregate
Estimated global aggregate annual cases in 2006 5.4 million
Estimated global total annual economic burden in 2006 $1.70 billion
Global average cost per case $313
Proportion of economic burden relieved by new
treatment to be spent on that treatment
50%
Parameter Levels of reduction in cost
20% economic
burden relieved
40% of economic
burden relieved
60% of economic
burden relieved
Economic burden relieved by new drug
treatment ($, millions)
337 675 1013
Portion of economic relief to be spent on new
drug treatment ($, millions)
169 338 506
Proposed price for new drug treatment ($) 31 63 94
Table 4
Assumptions for dengue vaccine impact calculations.
Assumptions Most likely
value
Distribution Minimum
value
Maximum
value
Standard deviation or custom values
Probability of Sanoﬁ vaccine approval Yes = 1 Yes–No 0 1 75% yes, 25% no
Launch date of competitor vaccines 2019 Discrete
uniform
2017 2021 NA
Susceptible population (millions) 3000 Triangular 2500 3500 NA
Number of additional vaccines 1 Custom discrete 0 6 19.2% 0, 35.7% 1, 28.5% 2, 12.63% 3, 3.36% 4, 0.54%
5,0.05% 6
Vaccine efﬁcacy 81% Minimum
extreme
50% 95% Scale 9%
Multiplier for unreported cases 6 Normal 4.15 7.85 0.6
Regimen (doses) for additional vaccines 3 Custom discrete 1 3 20% 1, 30% 2, 50% 3
Vaccine wastage 25% Normal 17% 33% 2.5%
Proportion of cases in non-Suaya
countries
.36 Normal 0.25 0.47 0.036
Market uptake of Sanoﬁ vaccine each
year
25% Normal 17% 33% 2.5%
Market uptake of alternate vaccines per
year
25% Normal 17% 33% 2.5%
Average life expectancy in susceptible
regions
71.9 Minimum
extreme
60 78 Scale 3.6
Diversion of capacity to western
markets
10% Normal 7% 13% 1%
Population growth 1.02% Normal 0.6% 1.5% 0.102%
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dengue drugs
Pharmaceutical innovators require a period of market exclusiv-
ity after drug approval in order to recoup research and develop-
ment costs. In industrialized countries, this is accomplished
through patent protection, data exclusivity and/or an explicit
market exclusivity period provided by statute. While many of
these legal provisions exist in middle income countries (IFPMA,
2011), the perceived fairness of proposed pricing is an equally
important consideration. Many countries have nationalized pat-ents when the price of life-saving medications has been perceived
to be excessive. Also, while some countries have legal capacity to
allow a period of market exclusivity, there may not be an explicit
requirement or mandated minimum period. Therefore, pricing of
interventions that are considered in the vital national interest are
likely to be based on negotiation with key regional governments,
rather than set in the free market. (Brazil’s recent pricing agree-
ment with GSK for pneumococcal vaccine is an example of this).
Our proposal is that the fairest way to negotiate premium pricing
during a period of market exclusivity is on the basis of economic
burden relieved.
Fig. 2. Projected clinical dengue cases (millions): 2015–2033. The horizontal axis
represents calendar years.
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vent disease progression, and thereby decrease medical costs, and
time away from work and school. Therefore, while interventions
impose an economic burden, they offer a counterbalancing reduc-
tion in economic burden if priced appropriately. All the input eco-
nomic costs of a disease and the degree to which an intervention
relieves them are, in theory, measurable in clinical trials. The po-
tential ranges of therapeutic effects of a dengue drug are 20–60%
relief of symptoms which we have assumed will translate into an
equivalent reduction in economic burden. From a practical stand-
point, it would be difﬁcult to demonstrate that the effect of a drug
was statistically signiﬁcant if its magnitude did not exceed 20%.
This sets our ﬂoor. We selected an upper limit of 60% since there
are very few drugs on the market that reduce symptoms in a treat-
ment setting to that degree. We then determined the maximum
potential value created by one or more dengue drugs that collec-
tively capture 100% value over a range of possible effectiveness
(Table 3) and the weighted average cost per case based on the in-
put data in Table 2.
Assuming that there was consensus that drug pricing should be
agreed on the basis of economic burden relieved during a tempo-
rary period of market exclusivity, it follows that the price negoti-
ated would represent some fraction of the total aggregate costs
of dengue on a country by country basis. In theory, a national gov-
ernment should be willing to pay a total aggregate cost for provi-
sion of a dengue drug that is $1 less than the economic costs
saved by the same drug. In this situation, a national government
would effectively save $1 to alleviate a deﬁned percentage of mor-
bidity and mortality associated with dengue. However, this is un-
likely to be perceived as fair by sovereign governments or the
public who have a more humanitarian view of the alleviation of
morbidity and mortality. We propose that a more attractive ap-
proach to pricing for the purchasers might be to split the expected
economic beneﬁts created by a drug evenly between the supplier
and the party realizing those economic beneﬁts. A pricing strategy
which allows the purchasers to realize a net economic savings will
provide greater incentive for more rapid adoption of a newly li-
censed drug. We used this assumption as the basis of determining
per case costs and the total market for dengue drugs globally and
for several key national markets.
In developing our projections we have also made several other
assumptions. To prevent inappropriate administration for non-
dengue febrile illnesses and counterfeiting, we expect that a den-
gue drug would not be made available to patients outside of a
health care setting where a diagnosis of dengue can be established.
It is likely that most dengue patients that would desire a dengue
drug would initially be seen either in an ambulatory setting such
as a health clinic or in a hospital. We have based our pricing on
the weighted average cost of dengue cases on a country by countryFig. 1. Projected proportion (%) of susceptible population unvaccinated: 2015–
2033. The horizontal access represents calendar year.basis, assuming that drug distribution would be through national
Ministries of Health (MOHs) for all intra-country market segments.
The vaccine impact modeling suggests that the annual clinical
case load of dengue is not likely to decline between the introduc-
tion of a dengue vaccine (2015) and the end of a period of market
exclusivity of eight years for a dengue drug licensed in 2025
(2033). Therefore, the maximum potential market for dengue
drugs was based on the estimated dengue clinical case load used
by Suaya et al., adjusted by a factor of 6 for unreported cases.
The reader should note that our projections represent the maxi-
mum potential value of the entire market for dengue drugs during
a period of market exclusivity. This does not mean that the entire
value would be captured by the sales of one drug since there may
be competitors, and no one drug may have the perfect proﬁle to
justify its use in all clinical settings.3. Results
The total economic burden of dengue in each market segment
that is presented in Table 1 for the eight countries examined by
Suaya and colleagues. These were adjusted for unreported cases
and other dengue markets not examined by Suaya et al., to yield
a total economic burden of dengue is at least 2006 USD $1.69 bil-
lion annually (Table 3). Assuming dengue drugs had been available
in 2006, and reduced 20%, 40% or 60% of costs, the total potential
value created for patients and national governments would have
been 2006 US $337, 676 and 1013 million respectively (Table 3).
These values are relevant for the idealized case of a market with
a single drug or multiple drugs during a period of market exclusiv-
ity and 100% value capture.
Dengue vaccination has the potential to dramatically reduce the
number of clinical cases (and therefore the unmet medical need for
a dengue drug) if it were possible to vaccinate a proportion of the
population greater than that required for induction of herd immu-
nity. Our projections suggest that even by 2033, under the likeliest
circumstances, the majority of the susceptible population (84%)
will remain unvaccinated (Fig. 1) and in 97.5% of our simulations
the proportion unvaccinated exceeded 75% (Fig. 3). This suggests
that herd immunity will not be reached globally prior to 2033,
since this would require that 80–85% of the population be
vaccinated.
The number of clinical cases is projected to peak in 2022 at
6.1 million per annum, but is projected to remain higher than
5.8 million cases throughout the period from 2015–2033 (Fig. 2).
In 2033, the most likely scenario was 5.9 million clinical cases,
with 97.5% of simulations resulting in 4.5 million cases per annum.
For the proportion unvaccinated, the largest sources of variance
were (i) the probability of the Sanoﬁ vaccine achieving licensure,
Fig. 3. Range of projected outcomes for susceptible population unvaccinated in 2033.
Fig. 4. Sources of variability in projected outcomes for susceptible population unvaccinated in 2033.
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achieve the desired level of efﬁcacy. For projected clinical cases,
the largest sources of variance were (i) the multiplier for unre-
ported cases, (ii) the proportion of dengue cases in non-Suaya
countries and (iii) population growth. The implications of different
assumptions regarding these sources of variance are discussed
later.
The vaccine impact calculations suggest that the introduction of
a dengue vaccine will not reduce the projected clinical case below
2006 levels in the short-medium term (through 2033). Effectively
this means that the economic burden described here for denguein 2006 will persist, and is not addressable by dengue vaccination
unless there are major deviations from our current level of knowl-
edge not factored into our simulations. However, this unmet med-
ical need and economic burden is addressable with dengue drugs.
Therefore, in the calculations for the size of the potential dengue
drug market that follow, we have assumed a persisting annual eco-
nomic burden of dengue equivalent to 2006. Presumably, in the ab-
sence of a dengue vaccine, the number of dengue cases would have
continued to increase as a function of population growth (more
susceptible individuals), increased urbanization (increased concen-
tration of people with vectors) and climate change (expanded
Fig. 5. Range of projected clinical cases (millions) in 2033.
Fig. 6. Sources of variability in projected outcomes for projected clinical cases in 2033.
G. Dow, E. Mora / Antiviral Research 96 (2012) 203–212 209range of vectors). Our calculations explicitly do not address the
economic burden that might be associated with this putative
expansion in dengue cases that is preventable through vaccination.
Our proposal for tiered pricing is that during a negotiated peri-
od of market exclusivity, national governments would agree to pay
an amount for an intervention that is equivalent to 50% of the eco-
nomic burden relieved by that intervention. If this proposal were
to become widely adopted, the maximum value of the potential
market for dengue drugs annually would be 2006 US $169, 338
and 506 million if on average the available drugs reduced 20%,40% or 60% of the economic burden of dengue respectively (Ta-
ble 3). These ﬁgures might be lower if the period of market exclu-
sivity of one or more innovator drugs had expired.
The price per course of treatment was calculated based using
this model. For a drug that reduced 40% of economic costs, the
weighted global average cost is $63 per treatment course (Table 3).
Regional pricing would be $77, $115, $133 and $23 for Brazil, Thai-
land, Malaysia and Cambodia respectively (Table 5). Note that this
is the total price for an effective treatment course of a dengue drug,
NOT the expected price per pill.
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Dengue is classiﬁed as a neglected disease by the World Health
Organization (WHO, 2012b). From the perspective of a pharmaceu-
tical innovator, this implies that in aggregate the commercial mar-
ket for drugs or vaccines for this disease might be small. For
dengue drugs this is even more pertinent if dengue vaccines effec-
tively induce herd immunity. As dengue drug discovery and devel-
opment ratchets up over the next ten years it is essential to
understand whether this reﬂexive assumption is true. If the esti-
mate of the maximum size of the potential market for a dengue
drug did not exceed the cost of development of even a single suc-
cessful dengue drug (which in itself would be unlikely to capture
100% value), it follows that dengue drug development would be
a ﬁnancially futile endeavor or would require large government
subsidies to be successful.
In order to arrive at such an estimate of the potential market for
dengue drugs we have proposed solutions or simulations of three
complex social, commercial and scientiﬁc problems: (i) estimation
of the global economic burden of dengue, (ii) dengue vaccine im-
pact calculations and (iii) an alternative to tiered drug pricing.
We consider each of these solutions to represent Version 1.0. This
is because we have made many assumptions where there may be
limits to what is currently or publicly known, and/or we have made
simpliﬁcations of evolutionary or economic dynamics out of neces-
sity. In the next few paragraphs we have attempted to put some of
these issues in context.
With respect to estimation of the global economic burden of
dengue, we have assumed that the multiplier for unreported cases
is 6, that the cases load of dengue outside those countries studied
by Suaya et al. is 36%, and that the economic burden of dengue in
those countries can be approximated based on GDP. Our model
also incorporates the limitations of the input economic data gen-
erated by Suaya et al. the most important of which is that it is not
known whether the experience of regional hospitals and medical
clinics is representative of an entire country. The use of a multi-
plier for unreported cases is well established in the literature; in-
deed Suaya et al. (2009) utilized multipliers in initial projections
of the regional economic burden of dengue. A multiplier of 6 for
all dengue cases has been suggested, and this value is the approx-
imate weighted average of conservative estimates of multipliers
for hospitalizations (1.6) and ambulatory cases (10) assuming a
50:50 split in the case load (see summary in Suaya et al., 2009).
Our assumption, that 36% of the dengue burden is represented
by non-Suaya countries, reﬂects the best publicly available infor-
mation, but will need to be adjusted in Version 2.0 if better esti-
mates are forthcoming. Extrapolation of costs based on GDP is
necessarily approximate, but is not unreasonable given relative
medical and labor costs should be broadly reﬂective of differences
in GDP.
With respect to vaccine impact calculations, the variables, other
than the above, that contributed the greatest variance in our simu-
lations were (i) the probability of approval of the Sanoﬁ vaccine, (ii)
vaccine efﬁcacy, (iii) number of doses required for effectiveness and
(iv) population growth. The Sanoﬁ dengue vaccine is currently in
Phase III. While much of the risk has been discharged, hurdles re-
main. These include meeting internal corporate targets for vaccine
safety and efﬁcacy, regulatory approval of the production process,
regulatory approval of the clinical data package, and education on
national governments of the beneﬁts of a dengue vaccine versus
the potential risk of antibody mediated enhancement and setting
an appropriate price. The point is that the probability of success is
not 100%. Since the dengue vaccine will protect people from four
viruses, not one, it is unlikely that the efﬁcacy of a dengue vaccine
will be the same as vaccines for Japanese encephalitis and yellowfever (i.e.95%). The Sanoﬁ vaccine is known to be a three dose reg-
imen, but it is not yet known whether other vaccines will offer
improvements. This is likely to be the case since it will offer a mar-
keting advantage, however our assumed distribution reﬂects our
perception that the bulk of regimens given will remain in the three
dose format.
In the background to our dengue vaccine impact simulations we
have included some necessary simpliﬁcations. For example, we
have assumed that clinical case rates are related linearly to the
absolute number of unvaccinated individuals, and ignored the pos-
sible interactions between different strains of dengue. It would be
better to make such assumptions based on actual data, but this
information either does not exist at a global level, or will not be
known until many years after vaccine introduction. Others in the
ﬁeld making calculations about vaccine cost effectiveness have
made similar assumptions out of necessity (Shepard et al., 2004).
We have also assumed that the partial dengue immunity in the
community is ‘baked in’ to 2006 reported dengue case rates, and
have not factored this effect on the dengue vaccine regimen be-
cause there are no data. It is also possible that dengue vaccines
may not offer life-long protection, but again, there are no data.
These uncertainties highlight the fact that the introduction of den-
gue vaccines represents a vast evolutionary experiment for which
we do not yet know the outcome.
We highlighted the challenges of tiered pricing earlier. The
world community has a fundamental choice to make if a better
balance is to be achieved between incentives and risk reduction
for pharmaceutical innovators and greater access of patients to
better drugs. It would be preferable if pharmaceutical companies
were more transparent about true research and development
costs and governments directly reimbursed the cost of develop-
ment of a successful drug. Such an approach would obviate
most of the requirement for temporary market exclusivity and
facilitate greater competitiveness within a shorter duration of
time after drug licensure. We would welcome such a develop-
ment; however the political obstacles are likely to be
challenging.
An alternative is that there is an agreed period of market exclu-
sivity independent of traditional legal concepts centering on intel-
lectual property (patents and data exclusivity) during which a
company is able to charge premium pricing. This may have been
the basis from which GSK negotiated pricing for the pneumococcal
vaccine with the government of Brazil (Moon et al., 2011). In this
scenario, GSK is currently able to charge a set a price for eight years
in exchange for technology transfer to Brazil at the end of this per-
iod. Here we are going further in proposing that negotiated pricing
should be based on the measurement of economic burden relieved,
where an innovator company receives 50% of the economic burden
relieved on a per case basis. Inherent in this assumption is that it
will be more common that not in the future that pricing of drugs
for neglected diseases during periods of market exclusivity will
be determined through negotiation with ministries of health and
sovereign governments, not by the free market. Of course it is also
reasonable to assume that at the conclusion of a period of market
exclusivity, prices would be set on the basis of generic competition
in a free market.
From the perspective of potential customers, our proposed pric-
ing (Table 5) seems appropriate given what is known about other
drugs for neglected diseases. Our model generated a lower end
price for a treatment course of $13.80 (Cambodia for a drug asso-
ciated with 20% reduction in cost) versus an upper pricing limit
for a drug that reduced costs by 60% of $239 (Malaysia, data not
shown). Pricing is tiered in the sense that less developed countries
such as Cambodia would pay less than middle income countries
such as Brazil. However, the model is more calibrated than tradi-
Table 5
Economic burden, resources spent on, and prices for a drug that reduces dengue costs by 40% in Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia. Monetary values are in 2006 $ US.
Parameter Market
Brazil Thailand Malaysia Cambodia
Economic burden relieved by new drug treatment ($, millions) 360 111 49 3
Proportion of economic relief to be spent on new drug product ($, millions) and proportion of total global sales (%) 180 (50) 56 (16) 25 (7) 1.5
Price per case ($) 77 115 133 23
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tries (for example Brazil versus Thailand) would pay the same
price. The range of pricing is appropriately lower than the cost of
generic liposomal amphotericin for visceral leishmaniasis ($250,
Moon et al., 2011), and the annual cost of HIV drugs in sub-Saharan
Africa (up to $1000, Moon et al., 2011), given that those diseases
are more life-threatening. At the lower end ($13.80 in Cambodia),
pricing compares favorably with that of antimalarial drugs (up to
$4.30, Tren et al., 2011) in sub-Saharan Africa, especially when
one considers that antimalarial drugs are heavily subsidized. It is
also important to remember that the actual cost per tablet will
be lower than this, since a multiple day course of treatment is
likely to be needed for dengue. We also remind the reader that
we calculated prices only for countries where the input costs of
dengue have been published (i.e. Suaya et al., 2009).
If such a pricing scheme came to fruition, the maximum poten-
tial total market for a drug or drugs that on average reduced 40% of
costs and that collectively captured 100% of value during a period
of market exclusivity is $338 million annually. This would be likely
to remain stable during the period of market exclusivity after the
introduction of the ﬁrst innovator drug (perhaps as early as
2020), since competing innovator companies will attempt to set
prices of new drugs at similar relative levels to the ﬁrst innovator
compound. An innovator compound entering such a market might
generate 2006 US $2703 million ($338 million  8 years) assuming
no competition. Since large pharmaceutical companies are willing
to spend around 19% of revenue on research and development
(Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, 2006), it follows that a total research
and development spend of $514 million to capture such revenues
might be feasible ($2703 million  19%). Since major pharmaceuti-
cal companies active in the neglected disease sector (e.g. GSK) have
publicly stated that a proﬁt margin of 5% of revenue might be
acceptable in this space (compared to the normal industry average
of 16%), it follows that the potential research and development
spend might potentially be as high as $811 million ($2703 mil-
lion  (19 + 11%)). This is substantially higher than the median cost
of a Phase III development program (2000 US $62 million) and post
licensure research and development costs (2000 US $140 million,
Di Masi et al., 2003).
However, it is important to reiterate that a single drug will not
capture the entirety of this potential market as revenues due to the
combined effect of competition from other innovator compounds
and the likelihood that a single drug would not be appropriate
for or reach all patients. Further articulation of this point would re-
quire more detailed information about a speciﬁc proposed dengue
drug and is beyond the scope of the present work. Also, the mon-
etary size of the potential market will likely decline after the intro-
duction of generic versions of the ﬁrst innovator compound as
prices fall due to competition. The potential market would also
be lower if the impact of vaccines on clinical case loads is greater
than our simulations suggest. On the other hand, our model does
not include additional sources of revenue such as licensing fees
from out of ﬁeld indications (e.g. hepatitis C) or the priority review
voucher, and excludes the potential increase in the market thatwould result from dengue vaccine failure or low vaccine uptake
due to safety concerns regarding antibody-mediated enhancement.
On balance, and in spite of many uncertainties and gaps in the
data, our ﬁndings suggest that the potential market for a dengue
drug, in terms of both the monetary value of the market and the
annual number of dengue cases, will remain sufﬁcient to facilitate
the introduction of one or more dengue drugs. We anticipate that
this will complement the expected use of vaccines in combating
the morbidity, mortality and economic burden of dengue in the
future.
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